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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
1
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”
Lady Liberty’s proclamation has, for years, signaled the United
States’ welcoming attitude towards immigrant populations. This
welcoming decree, however, stands in sharp contrast with the harsh
realities faced by unaccompanied alien children in the U.S.
immigration system.
Unaccompanied alien children face severe and permanent
penalties in the U.S. immigration system for falsely claiming
2
For such minors, the golden door to legal
citizenship.
immigration into the United States may be forever closed for
mistakes made while U.S. law considered them children.
This note addresses the legal capacity of unaccompanied alien
children to make a false claim to U.S. citizenship under section
3
212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

1. Emma
Lazarus,
The
New
Colossus
(1883),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6359435.
2. See infra Part III (discussing permanent inadmissibility stemming from
falsely claiming citizenship).
3. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (2006) [hereinafter INA]. Many of the justifications for
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First, this note will explain important INA definitions and concepts
critical to understanding the full weight of the false claims
4
provision. Second, it will outline the history of the INA and some
5
notable amendments. Third, it will address Minnesota’s recent
encounter with the false claims provision by outlining a case
6
pending at the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Fourth, it will
explore various provisions of the INA and agency regulations that
support a categorical rule excluding unaccompanied alien children
7
from section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii). Fifth, it will rely on the United
States’ long tradition of distinguishing between minor and adult
offenders in the criminal context to justify such a distinction in
8
immigration law.
Sixth, it will present policy reasons for
concluding unaccompanied alien children lack legal capacity to
9
falsely claim U.S. citizenship. Finally, it will propose potential
options for shielding unaccompanied alien children from the
10
severe consequences of the false claims provision.
II. KEY TERMINOLOGY IN THE IMMIGRAITON AND NATIONALITY ACT
This section explains important statutory definitions and
concepts helpful to understanding the INA and false claims
provision.
11
All noncitizens are considered “aliens” under the INA.

exempting unaccompanied alien children from section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) apply to
all minor aliens. This note, however, will focus exclusively on the need to exclude
unaccompanied alien children as immigration law takes their unaccompanied
status into account in a variety of other provisions and regulations. See infra Part V.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.A.
8. See infra Part V.B.
9. See infra Part VI.
10. See infra Part VII.
11. INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006). It is important to note
that, under the INA, there is a rare group of individuals who are considered
neither “citizens” nor “aliens.” People falling into this group are considered
“nationals” of the United States. See INA § 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22).
Although all “citizens” are considered “nationals,” not all “nationals” are
considered “citizens.” Id. However, instances where an individual can properly be
designated a “national” and not a “citizen” are very rare. See Certificates of Non
Citizen
Nationality,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/law/citizenship/citizenship_781.html (last visited Mar. 13,
2011). As a result, the distinction between “citizen” and “noncitizen national” is
immaterial for purposes of this note.
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Within the category of “alien,” “immigrant” refers to all aliens
except those falling within specified categories of “nonimmigrant
13
aliens.” Nonimmigrant aliens, for example, include ambassadors,
14
diplomats, temporary students, and foreign government officials.
The immigrant-nonimmigrant alien distinction is important in the
15
context of discretionary waivers discussed in Part III.
The INA defines “child” as an unmarried individual under the
16
age of twenty-one for the purposes of family-based petitions. The
17
INA primarily defines “child” in reference to the “parent.”
It
should be noted that the statute and the implementing agencies

12. INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15).
13. Id.
14. See id. § (a)(15)(A)–(V) (outlining the categories of nonimmigrant
aliens). A common factor among the nonimmigrant alien categories is the
requirement that the alien have no intention to abandon the foreign residence at
the time of entry. See id.
15. See infra Part III and notes 61–62.
16. INA § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). The INA treats “children”
primarily as subsets of their parents for the purpose of obtaining immigration
benefits. The “child” exists only in relation to a parent. This parent-child
relationship forms the bedrock of determining who may immigrate as an
immediate relative. David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the ParentChild Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1180–82 (2006) [hereinafter Thronson,
Choiceless Choices] (describing the role of the parent-child relationship in
immigration law). The INA’s treatment of children leads to a structural
imbalance. See id. at 1186. Children cannot petition for themselves; their status
depends on their parents’ status. Id. at 1181. This dependency is one way,
however, as children cannot file applications for their parents until reaching age
twenty-one. See Faustino v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 302 F. Supp. 212
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (rejecting child petitioner’s attack on the constitutionality of the
INA based on her inability to file a valid petition for her father).
17. See David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of
Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 991 (2002)
[hereinafter Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids] (explaining that immigration law “does
not conceive of a ‘child’ existing outside this relationship”). Unaccompanied
alien children do not fit neatly within the INA’s parent-child framework. Id. at
998–99. Without the requisite parent, unaccompanied alien children are not
afforded “child” status. Without another alternative, unaccompanied alien
children are often treated as adults by default and lack options tailored to their
unique position. Thronson, Choiceless Choices, supra note 16, at 1186–87 (outlining
immigration law’s inflexible response to minors who fall outside the traditional
family-related framework); Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids, supra at 997
(“[I]mmigration law provides no alternative and simply treats unaccompanied
children as adults by default.”). Thus, in most cases “the forms of relief available
to children are . . . identical to those available to adults.” Devon A. Corneal, On the
Way to Grandmother’s House: Is U.S. Immigration Policy More Dangerous than the Big Bad
Wolf for Unaccompanied Juvenile Aliens?, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 609, 625 (2004)
(exploring the forms of relief available to minors facing deportation).
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use somewhat inconsistent terminology to refer to individuals
under eighteen years old. The term “juvenile” is defined as
18
someone under age eighteen. “Minor,” however, is not defined in
the INA. Nonetheless, “juvenile” and “minor” appear to be used
19
“Unaccompanied alien child” is defined
interchangeably.
elsewhere in the U.S. Code as a child: under the age of eighteen;
without legal immigration status; and who lacks a parent or
20
guardian. To add to the confusion, a “special immigrant juvenile”
(SIJ) is an alien under twenty-one years old who has been deemed a
21
dependent of the state by a juvenile court.
This note will use the term “minor” when referencing all aliens
under age eighteen and “unaccompanied alien children” for
individuals meeting the definition outlined above. The term
“juvenile” will be used to reference the same group of aliens but in
the juvenile and criminal court settings.

18. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.3 (2010).
19. Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004). The
agency also attempts to distinguish between minors under age fourteen and those
age fourteen to seventeen. See id. (rejecting the Board of Immigration’s (BIA)
reliance on the provision requiring notice to the authorized adult only in the case
of minors under the age of fourteen); 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(ii) (“[I]n the case of
a minor under 14 years of age, service shall be made upon the person with whom
the . . . minor resides . . . .”).
20. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2006). The Senate proposed adding this
definition to the INA in the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2007.
See S. 844, 110th Cong. § 235(g) (2007). While not officially defined in the INA,
various policies and subsequent congressional acts have incorporated the
Homeland Security Act’s definition of unaccompanied alien child. See, e.g.,
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5081 (2008) [hereinafter TVPRA]
(incorporating by reference the definition of “unaccompanied alien child”);
Memorandum from Joseph E. Langlois, Chief, United States Citizenship &
Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., to All Asylum Office Staff (March 25, 2009), 2009
WL 1102788 [hereinafter USCIS Asylum Division Memorandum] (outlining
procedures for handling cases filed by unaccompanied alien children);
Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, Office of the
Chief Immigration Judge, to Immigration Judges, Court Administrators, Judicial
Law Clerks, and Immigration Court Staff (Sept. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Office of
the Chief Immigration Judge Memorandum], available at http://www.nlada.org
/Training/Train_Civil/Equal_Justice/2007_Materials/109_2007_Kerwin_handout
5 (providing guidance for adjudicating cases involving unaccompanied alien
children).
21. INA § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
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At the heart of the INA are provisions governing
22
inadmissibility and deportability. Inadmissibility and deportability
grounds are separated by whether a noncitizen has been admitted
23
to the United States. “Admission” refers to whether an alien has
lawfully entered the country after inspection by an immigration
24
official. Aliens seeking admission into the country are subject to
25
Aliens may be inadmissible for
the grounds of inadmissibility.
actions such as crimes, fraud, terrorist activity, and falsely claiming
26
to be U.S. citizens.
Most grounds of inadmissibility have corresponding grounds
of deportability that apply to noncitizens who have been legally
27
admitted into the United States.
Admitted aliens may be
deportable for violating their immigration status or for being
28
Deportable aliens have
inadmissible at the time of entry.
historically been afforded more constitutional protections than
29
inadmissible aliens.
22. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (grounds of inadmissibility); INA § 237, 8
U.S.C. § 1227 (grounds of deportability).
23. Compare INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (inadmissible aliens who are
ineligible to be admitted to the United States) (emphasis added), with INA § 237(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a) (categories of deportable aliens who have been admitted to the
United States) (emphasis added).
24. INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Prior to 1996, the
defining act was physical entry into the United States. See THOMAS ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 508 (5th ed.
2003). When applying the admission framework to noncitizens in the country
without authorization, a legal fiction arises: despite being physically present, they
are considered to be standing, for legal purposes, at the border seeking admission.
See id. (explaining how after the 1996 reforms undocumented aliens within the
U.S. border no longer have an advantage over aliens seeking admission at the
border).
25. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Aliens bear the burden of establishing
that they are “clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and [that they are]
not inadmissible.” Matovski v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 722, 738 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(b)).
26. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
27. INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227. The INA includes language of deportability
and removability. Both terms reference the expulsion of aliens from the country.
See id. (governing grounds of deportability); INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a
(governing removal proceedings). This note will follow the statutory language
and use “deportability” in reference to grounds of deportability and “removability”
in the context of removal proceedings.
28. INA § 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1).
29. Compare United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544
(1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”), with Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344
U.S. 590, 598 n.5 (1953) (“The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien
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After admission, noncitizens may apply for adjustment of status
30
to become legal permanent residents (LPR). A key component of
the adjustment process is that the alien must be “eligible to receive
31
an immigrant visa and . . . admissible.”
If an applicant is
permanently inadmissible, as in the case of the false claims
32
provision, adjustment of status is permanently barred. Thus, in
the Minnesota case discussed below, the respondent’s permanent
inadmissibility due to the false claim of citizenship permanently
bars adjustment of status, despite the availability of an immediate
33
visa through a U.S. citizen spouse.
The INA contains two mechanisms for expelling aliens from
34
the country. First, aliens may be placed in removal proceedings.
Removal proceedings take place before an immigration judge who
may grant relief or order the alien removed from the United
35
States.
Inadmissible and deportable aliens may be placed in
36
Second, aliens may be subjected to
removal proceedings.
37
Expedited removal, unlike removal
expedited removal.
proceedings, applies only to arriving aliens who have not been
38
admitted.
After determining the alien is inadmissible under
section 212(a)(6)(C)—the false claims provision—the officer “shall
order the alien [expeditiously] removed from the United States
39
without further hearing or review . . . .”

seeking admission for the first time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully
enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed
by the Constitution to all people within our borders.”).
30. See INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255.
31. Id. at (a).
32. See INA § 212(a)(8)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(8)(A) (aliens permanently
ineligible to citizenship are inadmissible); see also INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)
(requiring aliens to be eligible to receive a visa and admissible for permanent
residence).
33. See infra Parts III–IV.
34. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
35. Id.; see INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (cancellation of removal); INA §
240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (voluntary departure).
36. INA § 240(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(2).
37. INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
38. Id.
39. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (“If an immigration
officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph
(F)) who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is
inadmissible under [sections 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this title], the officer
shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or
review . . . .”).
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III. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS PROVISION
A. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, also
40
known as the McCarren-Walter Act, was the first major
codification of comprehensive immigration laws for the United
41
The INA established the provisions governing, among
States.
42
many topics, inadmissibility and deportability of aliens. The INA
is reflective in its structure, with all of the grounds of inadmissibility
43
appearing in the grounds of deportability.
The original INA contained the precursor to the false claims
44
provision. This provision makes aliens who have misrepresented
themselves as U.S. citizens for the purpose of obtaining an
45
immigration benefit inadmissible. Under this provision, the false
statement has to be made with the goal of obtaining an
immigration-related benefit such as a visa, passport, or other
46
immigration document. Additionally, the misrepresentation has
to be made to a government official for the alien to be considered
47
inadmissible under the INA. Thus, aliens claiming to be citizens
on employment applications, for example, would not have made a
40. McCarran-Walter Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 182 (1952); NANCY
HUMEL MONTWIELER, THE IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW OF 1986, at 3 (1987).
41. HUMEL MONTWIELER, supra note 40.
While various iterations of
immigration laws preceded the 1952 act, it represented the “first piece of
legislation to include all aspects of immigration policy, including naturalization, in
one statute.”
AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION
FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:3 (4th ed. 2010).
42. INA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101. The McCarren-Walter Act introduced the
preference system for relatives and skilled workers and continued the quota system
used since the 1920s. HUMEL MONTWIELER, supra note 40. The 1952 version was
significant in that it was the first time all aspects of immigration policy were
embodied in one statute. FRAGOMEN, JR. & BELL, supra note 41.
43. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (governing grounds of inadmissibility);
INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (governing grounds of deportability). One ground of
deportability includes being inadmissible at the time of entry. See INA §
237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A).
44. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 182. The original misrepresentation
provision was codified as section 212(a)(19) in the INA. See id.
45. INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).
46. Id. (“Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact,
seeks to procure . . . a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United
States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.”).
47. See 5 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 63.07
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2008) (explaining a false claim to citizenship need not
be made to a government official like the misrepresentation ground requires).
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misrepresentation under INA section 212(a)(6)(i).
B. Notable Amendments to the INA

The INA has seen various amendments since its 1952
49
enactment. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of
1986 warrants mention as it demonstrated Congress’ increasing
50
The Act included employer
concern over illegal immigration.
sanctions in an effort to curb the hiring of undocumented
51
52
workers.
Congress’ effort to mitigate “out of control” illegal
immigration paved the way for some of the most restrictive
53
measures in the INA’s history.
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), a bill aimed at combating
54
illegal immigration trends.
IIRIRA provisions are scattered
48. See In re John Doe, 2007 WL 5326372 (Admin. App. Office June 1, 2007)
(reaffirming the BIA’s position that using fraudulent documents to secure
employment is not a benefit under the INA); see also INS MEMORANDA: INS ON
FALSE CLAIMS TO CITIZENSHIP, in 3 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 425 (1998) (explaining
that the misrepresentation provision requires misrepresentation for purposes of
obtaining a specific benefit under the INA such as a passport, visa, or passport).
49. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965); Act of Oct.
20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.
L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). The 1990 Act revamped nearly every provision
of the 1952 statute. FRAGOMEN, JR. & BELL, supra note 41, § 3:1:2. The Act
amended and added provisions for deportation procedures, expanding the
grounds applicable to aliens involved in criminal activities. Id. In response to the
2001 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
(USA PATRIOT Act). Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); FRAGOMEN, JR. & BELL,
supra note 41, at § 1:3:4.
50. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (1986); HUMEL MONTWIELER, supra note 40, at 4.
51. Immigration Reform and Control Act § 274A (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006)); see HUMEL MONTWIELER, supra note 40, at 31.
52. S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 3 (1985).
53. See 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 12 (2010); Charles C. Foster, 1996
Immigration Act: Its Impact on U.S. Legal Residents and Undocumented Aliens, 34 HOUS.
LAW. 28 (1997); President Signs Immigration Overhaul Measures, 73 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1317 (1996).
54. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET
AL., 1 IMMIGRATION LAW & BUSINESS § 1.9 (2010). In a subcommittee hearing on
the shortcomings of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), a former INS General Counsel testified that the “one
size fits all” approach tends to treat law-abiding immigrants the same as criminals.
He also criticized the new grounds of inadmissibility which leave many otherwise
eligible immigrants stranded in unlawful status. Shortfalls of the 1996 Immigration
Reform Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. Citizenship, Refugees, Border
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throughout the INA and amend nearly every provision. IIRIRA
included strict measures that expanded the grounds of
inadmissibility and deportability while decreasing the availability of
56
discretionary relief and judicial review.
Among the 1996 additions was the ground of inadmissibility
57
for falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen. The Act added section
58
212(a)(6)(C)(ii) to the INA. The provision reads, “Any alien who
falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to
be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under
59
this Act . . . or any other Federal or State law is inadmissible.”
After 1996, a false claim could be made to any private person with
authority to inquire into the alien’s nationality, such as an
60
employer.
Security, and Int’l Law, 110th Cong. 29-30 (2007) [hereinafter Shortfalls of the 1996
Legislation] (statement of Paul Virtue, former INS General Counsel and Executive
Associate Comm’r).
55. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–10; Shortfalls of the 1996 Legislation,
supra note 54, at 27 (testifying that the IIRIRA amended almost every section of
Title II of the INA).
56. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 54, at § 5:12. This “failure to look at the
totality of the circumstances, to exercise discretion and compassion where
warranted, and to evaluate each case on the merits, reflects a failure in our
system.” Shortfalls of the 1996 Legislation, supra note 54, at 30.
57. INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (2006). False claims
to U.S. citizenship appear in two other contexts. First, the INA has a
corresponding ground of deportability for falsely claiming to be a citizen. INA §
237(a)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D). Second, falsely claiming to be a citizen
carries a criminal penalty, with the potential of being fined and/or imprisoned.
18 U.S.C. § 911 (2006) (“Whoever falsely and willfully represents himself to be a
citizen of the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both.”). See United States v. Clark, 316 F.3d 210, 213 (3d Cir.
2003) (finding the use of a false birth certificate to obtain a state identification
card constitutes a false claim in violation of the criminal provision).
58. See Pub. L. No. 104-208. The amendment containing the false claims
provision, known as the Simpson Amendment, was designed to discourage legal
permanent residents and undocumented aliens from claiming to be citizens. 142
CONG. REC. S4017 (1996). Senator Simpson claimed the proposed amendment
would deter such behavior because the risks of claiming citizenship would be too
high. Id. The amendment also sought to deter undocumented aliens from
seeking work in the United States. Id.
59. INA § 212(a)(6)(c)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Courts have found the “any
purpose or benefit” requirement to include falsely claiming citizenship in a broad
variety of settings. See Ferrans v. Holder, 612 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming
denial of petitioner’s application for adjustment of status based on his false claim
to citizenship on an Employment Eligibility Verification Form); Estevez v. Attorney
Gen. of U.S., 307 F. App’x 694 (3d Cir. 2009).
60. 3C AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 2710 (2010). Various forms of
documents may be sufficient to find that an alien has falsely claimed to be a U.S.
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In enacting section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), Congress did not create
61
The
a waiver of this ground of inadmissibility for aliens.
discretionary waiver for section 212(a)(6)(C) has been applied only
62
to the misrepresentation provision under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i).
The 1996 provision effectively created a permanent statutory bar to
63
citizenship, with a few exceptions, for aliens found inadmissible
64
for making a false claim to citizenship.
Congress enacted a narrow exception to the inadmissibility of
aliens falsely claiming citizenship in the Child Citizenship Act
65
(CCA) of 2000. In addition to revising how children born outside
66
the country acquire U.S. citizenship, the CCA provides protection
67
68
from a finding of bad moral character, unlawful voting charges,

citizen. See generally Ateka v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2004) (denying
defendant’s petition for review of the BIA’s order of removal for defendant who
indicated he was a U.S. citizen on an employment eligibility form); United States v.
Clark, 316 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that defendant’s use of a
counterfeit birth certificate constituted a false claim to citizenship). But cf. Falsely
Claiming to Be U.S. National Does Not Bar Adjustment of Status, BIA Rules, 84
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1088 (2007) (discussing BIA case in which the BIA found
no error in the immigration judge’s grant of adjustment of status based on
respondent’s false claim to being a U.S. national).
61. GORDON ET AL., supra note 47. See In re Odwora, A097-672-154, 2008
Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 6635 (concluding that no waiver is available for false claims to
citizenship and applicant is barred from adjusting status); Theodros v. Gonzales,
490 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining that unlike the crime involving
moral turpitude (CIMT) provision, no waiver is available for falsely claiming U.S.
citizenship); Paz v. Gonzales, 140 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that
212(i) waiver applies only to 212(a)(6)(i) misrepresentations). While immigrants
who falsely claim to be U.S. citizens are permanently barred from adjusting status,
non-immigrants may seek a discretionary waiver of such a claim. INA §
212(d)(3)(A) or (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182; 3 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL., supra note 48, at
425.
62. Paz, 140 F. App’x, at 752.
63. See INA § 245(h)(2)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (exempting special immigrants
as defined in INA § 101(a)(27)(J) from § 212(a)(6)(C)); INA § 101(A)(15)(U);
INA § 209(c) (authorizing waiver for humanitarian purposes, family unity, or if
otherwise in the public interest).
64. The permanent ineligibility from falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen per
section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) stems from never being able to adjust status to
permanent residence under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The Attorney General has the
discretionary power to allow an alien to adjust to legal permanent residents (LPR)
status if, among other qualifications, the alien is “eligible to receive an immigrant
visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. §
1255.
65. Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (2000).
66. Id. § 101–02.
67. Id. § 201(a).
68. Id. § 201(b)(1).
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and allegations of falsely claiming citizenship if certain criteria are
69
met. First, each natural or adoptive parent of the child must be a
70
citizen of the United States, either by birth or naturalization.
Second, the alien must have permanently resided in the United
71
States prior to attaining age sixteen. Finally, the alien must have
reasonably believed he or she was a U.S. citizen when committing
72
the prohibited act, such as voting or claiming to be a U.S. citizen.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 officially abolished the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and transferred
most of its functions to the Department of Homeland Security
73
(DHS). Responsibility for care of unaccompanied alien children
in detention, however, transferred to the Office of Refugee
74
Resettlement (ORR).
ORR is charged with ensuring that the
interests of minors are considered in policies relating to the care
75
and detention of unaccompanied alien children.
C. Notable Proposed Amednments to the INA
In 2005, the Senate passed the Unaccompanied Alien Child
76
Protection Act (UACPA). The Act focused on some of the issues
surrounding the detention and care of unaccompanied alien
children. The Act included provisions on custody and release of
unaccompanied alien children, access to guardians ad litem, and
measures strengthening protections of unaccompanied alien
77
children. The UACPA asserts the government has a “fundamental
78
responsibility to protect unaccompanied children in its custody.”
69. Id. § 201(b)(2).
70. Id. § 201(b)(2) (amending INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002) (mostly codified in 6 U.S.C. § 101); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & NATURALIZATION
HANDBOOK § 1:9 (2010).
74. The Act prohibited the executive department from combining the two
branches or in any way consolidating their functions. U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at § 1:9. This separation ended the
contradictory function the INS served as both caretaker and jailer. Id.
75. 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2006).
76. S. 119, 109th Cong. (2005). Representative Lofgren (CA-16) introduced
the bill in the House in 2005. H.R. 1172, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill was
referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims one
month later. The bill died in committee. Id.
77. See S. 119, 109th Cong.
78. Lara Yoder Nafziger, Protection or Persecution?: The Detention of
Unaccompanied Immigrant Children in the United States, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/7

12

Kosse: Note: Banishing Children: The Legal (In) Capacity of Unaccompanie

1966

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:4

Most recently, Congress addressed the proposed Development,
79
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010 (DREAM Act).
The DREAM Act would have afforded a path to permanent
residence in the United States for certain aliens who entered the
country as children and fulfilled certain educational
80
requirements. While the measure passed the House, it failed to
garner enough votes to invoke cloture to reach a vote in the
81
Nonetheless, future passage of the DREAM Act could
Senate.
have a significant impact on efforts to address the permanent
ineligibility of unaccompanied alien children claiming false
citizenship.
The DREAM Act contained a provision giving the Secretary of
Homeland Security discretionary authority to cancel removal of
82
certain aliens and grant conditional nonimmigrant status.
In
order to be eligible for cancellation in this context, the alien must
have met various statutory requirements, including an educational
83
component.
The DREAM Act included one provision of
particular importance to this discussion: a waiver for section
212(a)(6)—the umbrella provision which contains the ground of
84
inadmissibility for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship. This waiver
made it possible for minors who have falsely claimed U.S.
citizenship to at least apply for the benefits afforded under the Act
rather than face a permanent bar to U.S. immigration benefits.

357, 396 (2006) (citing 151 Cong. Rec. S146, S304 (2005) (statement of Sen.
Dianne Feinstein)) (discussing the arrest and detention of unaccompanied
immigrant children in the United States).
79. H.R. 5281, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010).
80. See id. § 6(a).
81. For a list of major actions on the DREAM Act see H.R. 5281, 111th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2010), available at http://thomas.gov/home/LegislativeData.php (select
111th Congress, then search “H.R. 5281”).
82. Id. The opportunity to adjust to conditional nonimmigrant status appears
to be available only in the context of removal proceedings. See id. § 6 (allowing
cancellation of removal and granting conditional nonimmigrant status). Thus, to
gain such status, qualified aliens would have to enter removal proceedings to be
able to apply.
83. Id. § 6(a)(1)(D).
84. Id. § 6(a)(2) (allowing the secretary of Homeland Security to waive
misrepresentations under § 212(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2006))).
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The initial period of conditional nonimmigrant status was five
85
years and, provided certain additional requirements were met,
86
might have been extended for a second period of five years.
Upon completing a ten-year period, conditional nonimmigrants
87
may file an application to adjust their status to that of LPR.
Cancellation of removal combined with granting conditional
nonimmigrant status could have been one of the few, if not only,
routes around the permanent bar to permanent legal status for
some inadmissible aliens.
Despite the DREAM Act’s failure in the Senate, it once again
demonstrates congressional recognition that, in certain instances,
the current immigration system may produce harsh results that
necessitate a legislative response. Congress is unlikely to take up
88
the DREAM Act in the next session; however, enacting the
DREAM Act or a similar bill in the future could significantly impact
the status quo for certain unaccompanied alien children deemed
inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii).
This legislative trend indicates increasing concern for
unaccompanied alien children in terms of detention and custody.
While this is a step in the right direction, legislative actions have
thus far fallen short of adequately protecting unaccompanied alien
children who face permanent and serious consequences for
mistakes made before reaching adulthood.
IV. MINNESOTA TACKLES FALSE CLAIMS BY AN UNACCOMPANIED
ALIEN CHILD
The Eighth Circuit recently heard oral arguments in a
Minnesota immigration case involving a false claim to citizenship
89
made by an unaccompanied alien child.

85. Id. § 7(a).
86. Id. § 7(d). While granting the initial period of conditional nonimmigrant
status is discretionary, the second period appears to be mandatory, provided the
statutory requirements are met. Compare id. § 6(a)(1)(“Secretary of Homeland
Security may cancel removal . . . .”), with id. § 7(d)(1) (“Secretary of Homeland
security shall extend conditional nonimmigrant status . . . .” (emphasis added)).
87. Id. § 8(c).
88. Shankar Vedantam, Next Congress Unlikely to Pass DREAM Act, Republicans Say,
WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2010, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/23/AR2010122305377_pf.html.
89. Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600),
available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/oralargs/oaFrame.html.
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In 1998, the sixteen-year old respondent attempted to enter
the country from Mexico by presenting her sister’s birth certificate
90
to immigration officials at the airport. The respondent admitted
her real identity only after being presented with evidence
91
demonstrating she was not the true owner of the birth certificate.
A decade later, despite qualifying for an immediate relative
visa through her U.S. citizen spouse, she was placed in removal
proceedings as statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status and,
92
thus, removable.
DHS concluded she was ineligible for
adjustment of status based on her false claim to citizenship made at
93
age sixteen.
In the 2005 removal proceedings, the immigration judge in
Bloomington, Minnesota held that minors categorically lack the
legal capacity to make false claims under the INA and granted the
94
respondent’s petition for adjustment of status.
The judge
referred to permanently barring the respondent from the United
States for actions taken while an unaccompanied alien child as the
95
“immigration equivalent of the death penalty.”
DHS promptly appealed the immigration judge’s 2005
96
decision. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
rejected the judge’s interpretation in an unpublished opinion,
stating simply, “We find no legal authority . . . for the Immigration
97
Judge’s ‘bright line rule.’” On remand, the immigration judge
90. In re Sandoval, No. A29 303 178, 2007 WL 3301476 (B.I.A. Sept. 28, 2007).
Both opinions issued by the BIA in this case (In re Sandoval, No. A29 303 178, 2007
WL 3301476 (B.I.A. Sept. 28, 2007), and In re Sandoval, No. A029-303-178, 2009
Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 5568 (B.I.A. Oct. 8, 2009)) are unpublished and are not
relied on as official interpretations by the BIA.
91. Sandoval, 2009 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 5568, at *5.
92. Id. at *4; Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 093600), supra note 89, at 0:46-1:21.
93. Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600),
supra note 89, at 0:46-1:21.
94. See Sandoval, 2007 WL 3301476; Children Lack Capacity to Make False Claims
or Misrepresentations, IJ Holds, 83 INTERPRETER RELEASES 775, 775–76 (2006). The
case records and briefs are sealed pending the resolution of the case.
95. Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600),
supra note 89, at 7:46.
96. Sandoval, 2007 WL 3301476.
97. Id. The BIA simply cited the judge’s lack of authority and did not explain
its position in its two-paragraph, unpublished decision. See id. The panel of judges
at the Eighth Circuit oral argument appeared concerned about what rule the BIA
was promulgating. After some confusion over what significance the BIA’s short
opinion had, the court asked the government attorney, “Can you describe the
BIA’s rule or holding in twenty words or less?” Oral Argument, Sandoval v.
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ruled the respondent had falsely claimed citizenship and, thus, was
98
statutory ineligible to apply for adjustment. The BIA affirmed the
99
decision and dismissed the respondent’s second appeal.
The respondent appealed the BIA’s second decision and the
100
Eighth Circuit recently heard oral arguments on the case. At oral
argument, DHS asserted the respondent knew what she was doing
at the time was wrong and that she was old enough to appreciate
101
her actions.
DHS further argued she had not timely retracted
her false claim since she did not admit her real identity until
102
presented with evidence of the underlying misrepresentation.
The respondent asked the court to interpret the false claims
provision in a manner consistent with Congress’ otherwise
protective treatment of minors elsewhere in the INA by
103
categorically excluding minors. At the very least, the respondent
asked the court to remand the case to the BIA so it could issue a
104
formal decision.
V. UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN LACK LEGAL CAPACITY TO
FALSELY CLAIM CITIZENSHIP
Categorically excluding unaccompanied alien children from
being found permanently inadmissible to the United States is
consistent with the treatment of minors under other provisions of
105
the INA.
Minors are prohibited from seeking most benefits

Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600), supra note 89, at 19:51-22:47.
98. In re Sandoval, No. A029-303-178, 2009 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 5568, at *4
(B.I.A. Oct. 8, 2009).
99. Id. at *5–8.
100. Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600),
supra note 89, at 0:46-1:21.
101. Id. at 14:11-15:58.
102. Id. at 16:01-17:41.
Timely retractions of false testimony or
misrepresentations may overcome the permanent bar to relief for some aliens.
Matter of M, 9 I. & N. Dec. 118, 118 (B.I.A. 1960). An alien who “voluntarily and
without prior exposure of his false testimony comes forward and corrects his
testimony” may be considered to have timely retracted the false statement. Id. at
119.
103. Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600),
supra note 89, at 0:46-1:21.
104. Id. at 10:41.
105. It should be noted that some consulates have made some exceptions for
minors of various ages who have made false claims to citizenship. Wheeler, Update
from Ciudad Juarez, in 12-1 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 2 (2007). Minors fifteen or
younger may be found by the consulate to lack the mental capacity to falsely claim
citizenship. Id. For minors age sixteen or seventeen, the consulate may look at
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under the INA and are protected from some of the harshest
106
The permanent and severe sting of the false
consequences.
claims provision, therefore, appears contrary to this broader
protective treatment of unaccompanied alien children. The
following section addresses the process of statutory interpretation
courts undertake when reviewing official agency decisions. For the
sake of argument, this section will proceed as if the BIA had issued
a formal interpretation that section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) includes
unaccompanied alien children.
A. Statutory Interpretation Warrants Exempting Unaccompanied Alien
Children
When reviewing the official interpretations of the agency
charged with implementing a statute, courts generally apply
107
108
Chevron deference.
Unofficial interpretations are given the
109
lower Mead/Skidmore deference, in which agency decisions are
110
only given their inherent persuasive value.
A Chevron analysis consists of two steps. The first question is
whether Congress has already addressed the specific issue and if its
111
112
intent is clear.
If so, the intent of Congress governs.
Courts
the surrounding circumstances and the child’s mental capacity to determine if an
exception will apply. Id. A categorical approach, however, is preferred since it
conforms to the ideals underlying the United States’ traditional treatment of
minors in the juvenile and criminal systems. See infra part VI.B.
106. See, e.g., INA § 349(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2006) (requiring a national to
have achieved eighteen years of age before allowing many of the actions resulting
in irrevocable renunciation of citizenship to take effect); INA § 351(b), 8 U.S.C. §
1483(b) (allowing six months after attaining the age of eighteen for a national to
assert claim to nationality and revoke any renunciation of such under § 349(a)(3)
and (5) (8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) and (5)) prior to eighteenth birthday); INA §
334(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1445(b) (prohibiting application for naturalization by persons
under the age of eighteen); 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (requiring possession of, and
punishing for failure to possess, registration card for aliens over the age of
eighteen only).
107. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (discussing
the deferential standard afforded official interpretations of the statutes the agency
implements); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995) (granting Chevron deference for
permissible agency constructions of the statute).
109. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 218; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
110. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587–88 (2000)
(declining Chevron deference to an agency interpretation which lacked the force
of law); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
257–58 (1991) (affording only persuasive value to the agency’s interpretation).
111. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
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should not evaluate the statutory provision in isolation, but rather
113
evaluate it in the context of the statutory scheme. If Congress has
not directly addressed the issue, or if the statute is silent, the
114
second step is to evaluate whether the agency’s interpretation of
115
the statute is permissible. Agency regulations created to fill gaps
in the statute control unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, or
116
manifestly contrary to the statute.”
1. Section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) Is Arguably Ambiguous in Light of
Other INA Provisions and Agency Regulations
The false claims provision states, “Any alien who falsely
represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to be a
citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under this
117
Act . . . or any other Federal or State law is inadmissible.”
The
plain language is silent on the provision’s application to
unaccompanied alien children. Congressional intent elsewhere in
the INA demonstrates an overall concern for and protective
treatment of minors, warranting a conclusion that the false claims
provision is at least arguably ambiguous in light of the statutory
118
scheme.
The next section demonstrates why an agency’s treatment of
unaccompanied alien children under the false claims provision is
arbitrary based on its departure from the INA’s broader protective
treatment of minors.

112. Id. at 843.
113. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 132–33 (2000).
114. “Agency” will be used to reference the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ), Executive Office of
Immigration Review (EOIR), the Department of Justice (DOJ), or any other
government agency charged with implementing the INA or promulgating
regulations to supplement the Act.
115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
116. Id. at 844.
117. INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (2006).
118. See infra Part V.A.2.b.
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2. Including Unaccompanied Alien Children Within
212(a)(6)(C)(ii)’s Reach Is Contrary to the Statutory Scheme’s
Protective Nature
a. INA Provisions Support Special Treatment for
Unaccompanied Alien Children
A categorical exclusion of unaccompanied alien children from
the harsh consequences of section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) finds support
among other provisions of the INA. A comprehensive reading of
the INA demonstrates that minors are generally prohibited from
independently seeking immigration benefits and are shielded from
the harshest consequences.
First, the INA authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security
to grant SIJ status on minors who have been declared dependent
on a juvenile court or placed in the custody of a state agency,
119
department, or court-appointed individual. SIJs are able to adjust
status, even in spite of a false claim to citizenship, as section
212(a)(6) does not apply to the determination of an SIJ’s
120
admissibility.
An alien cannot file a valid application for naturalization until
121
The only way for a minor alien to achieve
age eighteen.
citizenship is as a derivative of a parent’s application for
122
citizenship.
Interestingly though, minor aliens cannot petition
123
for members of their family until age twenty-one. This imbalance
creates a situation where minor aliens can only be included on a
parent’s application and cannot file for their parent until age
124
twenty-one. Additionally, minor aliens are prohibited from filing
an affidavit of support for a sponsored alien until turning

119. INA § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
120. See INA § 245(h)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2)(A).
121. INA § 334, 8 U.S.C. § 1445.
122. See id.; INA § 320, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (discussing governing requirements for
children born outside the United States to acquire citizenship); INA § 322(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1433(a) (stating conditions for parents or grandparents applying for
certificate of citizenship for the minor child).
123. See Faustino v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 302 F. Supp. 212, 214
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing to 8 U.S.C. § 1151); David B. Thronson, Thinking Small: The
Need for Big Changes in Immigration Law’s Treatment of Children, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV.
L. & POL’Y 239, 253 (2010) [hereinafter Thronson, Thinking Small] (“Immigration
law assimilates children’s status to that of their parents, but does not allow the
assimilation of parents’ status to that of a child.”).
124. Thronson, Thinking Small, supra note 123, at 252–53 (discussing the INA’s
effective subordination of children’s status to that of their parents).
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eighteen.
Thus, minor aliens lack the autonomy and legal
capacity to seek U.S. citizenship for either themselves or their
family members.
Unaccompanied alien children receive special treatment in
127
the asylum provision governing the one-year filing deadline.
Typically, an application for asylum must be filed within one year of
128
arriving in the United States or the opportunity is lost.
The
statute allows for applications outside the one-year deadline due to
129
“extraordinary circumstances” which caused the delay. Since the
INA does not define “extraordinary circumstances,” DHS
130
The
promulgated a non-exhaustive list of such circumstances.
regulation includes “legal disabilities” for which the applicant may
131
be exempt from the one-year cutoff.
Unaccompanied alien
children, due to their legal disability of minority, fall within the
exception to the one-year filing deadline as interpreted by the
132
agency.
125. INA § 213(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(f)(1)(B).
126. In many respects, minors are treated as subsets of their parents for
immigration purposes. For example, the BIA consistently imputes the parents’
state of mind to the child. Senica v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 16 F.3d
1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 1994) (imputing the mother’s failure to reasonably
investigate her inadmissibility to her minor son). The BIA has also imputed the
parents’ abandonment of legal status to that of the minor. In re Zamora, 17 I. & N.
Dec. 395, 395 (B.I.A. 1980) (imputing the mother’s intent to abandon legal
permanent residence status to the child, preventing re-entry to the United States).
127. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii) (2010) (exempting unaccompanied alien
children from the one year filing deadline).
128. INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (requiring an alien to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed
within a year of arriving in the United States).
129. INA § 208(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (“[I]f the alien
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General . . . the existence of . . .
extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within
the period specified in subparagraph (B).”).
130. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5).
131. Id.
132. Advocates have called for extending the legal disability exemption to all
minors, arguing “[a]ll children suffer from a legal disability because of their
minority.” Lee Berger & Davina Figeroux, Protecting Unaccompanied Child Refugees
from the One-Year Deadline: Minority as a Legal Disability, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 855, 857
(2002) (urging that all children be exempted from the one year filing deadline in
asylum cases). In crafting the exemption, the agency relied on the definition of
“legal incapacity” in reference to someone vested with a legal right but who is
prevented from exercising it due to an impediment, citing minority as an example.
Id. at 858 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 685 (5th ed. 1979)). The definition
relied on by the agency appears to include all minors, regardless of
accompaniment. Id. at 859.
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The INA also protects minors from certain grounds of
inadmissibility or deportability that normally would apply had an
adult committed the offense. Ordinarily, a crime involving moral
turpitude (CIMT), which includes offenses such as theft, fraud, and
lying, renders an alien either inadmissible or removable from the
133
country.
However, if the alien committed the CIMT before
turning eighteen, the conviction does not make the minor
134
Likewise, juvenile delinquency
inadmissible or removable.
adjudications are not considered “convictions” for purposes of the
135
INA.
Recently, Congress provided further protections for
unaccompanied alien children in the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
136
(TVPRA). Section 235 of the TVPRA addresses increased efforts
137
to prevent child trafficking.
Several provisions pertain to
protecting unaccompanied alien children. First, immigration
officials have discretion to allow an unaccompanied alien child who
is deemed inadmissible at the border to withdraw his or her
138
application for admission. Second, officials are directed to place
unaccompanied alien children in removal rather than expedited

133. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (listing grounds
for inadmissibility of aliens who have committed a CIMT); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i),
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (listing grounds for deportability for CIMTs).
134. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (exempting
minors who have committed a CIMT from being found inadmissible). The
exception is limited to minors who have committed only one CIMT either five
years before applying for a visa or when the maximum penalty possible was less
than one year. Id. at § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)–
(II).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (2006); see In re Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362,
1365 (B.I.A. 2000)(“We have consistently held that . . . acts of juvenile delinquency
are not crimes, and that findings of juvenile delinquency are not convictions for
immigration purposes.”); In re Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 135, 137 (B.I.A.
1981)(“It is settled that an act of juvenile delinquency is not a crime in the United
States and that an adjudication of delinquency is not a conviction for a crime
within the meaning of our immigration laws.”); In re De La Nues, 18 I. & N. Dec.
140, 142 (B.I.A. 1981) (concluding a foreign conviction is not considered a crime
for U.S. immigration laws if it “constitutes an act of juvenile delinquency under
United States standards”). Additionally, congressional records do not indicate an
intention to include juvenile delinquency adjudications within the purview of INA
section 101(a)(48)(A)’s definition of “conviction.” Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec.
at 1369.
136. Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).
137. TVPRA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2010).
138. TVPRA § 1232(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(2)(B).
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139

removal proceedings.
Third, the Act transfers initial jurisdiction
over asylum applications filed by unaccompanied alien children to
the United States Immigration Citizenship and Immigration
140
Service (USCIS) Asylum Division.
As a result, unaccompanied
alien children applying for asylum, even if already in removal
proceedings, will have their cases reviewed by USCIS rather than an
141
immigration judge. Finally, the Act calls for regulations that take
into account the specialized needs of unaccompanied alien
142
143
children and training for all staff working with such minors.
Thus, while section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) does not explicitly
exclude minors from its reach, reading the false claims provision in
reference to other sections provides support for modifying the way
minors are treated under this ground of inadmissibility.
b. Agency Policies and Regulations Contemplate Special
Treatment of Unaccompanied Alien Children
Agency policies and official guidelines also recognize the
complicated situation presented by unaccompanied alien children
in detention and immigration court. Several regulations attempt to
address the need for specialized treatment and modified
procedures when dealing with unaccompanied alien children.
The first area in which the agency seeks to differentiate
between unaccompanied alien children and adults is detention.
One of the greatest challenges is how to deal with unaccompanied
144
alien children in immigration detention.
The agency identifies
its “paramount concern” as the minor’s welfare and emphasizes
145
family reunification when possible. When release is not possible,
agency regulations show a preference for home or shelter-care
146
environment, with detention being the exception.
At the very
139. See TVPRA § 1232(a)(5)(D)(i).
140. Id. § 235(d)(7)(B), 122 Stat. 5044, 5080–81 (2008).
141. See id.; USCIS Asylum Division Memorandum, supra note 20.
142. TVPRA § 235(d)(8), 122 Stat. at 5081.
143. Id. § 235(e), 122 Stat. at 5081.
144. Over the years, the number of unaccompanied alien children entering
the country has risen dramatically. The significant increase prompted the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service to codify a uniform policy for dealing with
unaccompanied alien children in exclusion and deportation proceedings.
Detention and Release of Juveniles, 53 Fed. Reg. 17449-01 (May 17, 1988)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1992)).
145. Id. at 17450 (“[R]eunification of the juvenile with his or her family is in
the best interest of all concerned.”).
146. Id. The preference for placing unaccompanied alien children in a shelter
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least, the regulations suggest keeping unaccompanied alien
147
children separate from the general adult detainee population.
Third, when a minor alien is the respondent in removal
proceedings, agency policies suggest the immigration judge use
148
“child sensitive procedures” in the courtroom.
A child-sensitive
approach in the courtroom includes measures such as allowing the
child to explore the courtroom before the proceedings, bring a toy,
sit next to a friend or adult companion, or allowing the judge to
149
conduct the proceedings without the judicial robe.
When
possible, unaccompanied alien children should be assigned to a
separate docket than adult immigrant detainees in removal
150
proceedings.
At a minimum, dockets should be scheduled to
prevent forcing unaccompanied alien children to be transported
151
with adult detainees.
Fourth, minors are not considered responsible for their rights
and responsibilities with respect to preparing and appearing for
152
final hearings at Immigration Court. The regulations require the
environment rather than detention mirrors the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act’s treatment of minors in custody pending juvenile delinquency adjudications.
Id. at 17449.
147. Id. at 17451. Despite the Flores settlement (see Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d
1352, 1354–57 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993))
and agency promises for improving the conditions of detained minors, the
requirements set out in Flores have largely been ignored. See Nafziger, supra note
78, at 379–85 (examining the conditions unaccompanied alien children face in
detention settings). Roughly eighty percent of unaccompanied alien children in
secure facilities have not committed any criminal offenses. Id. at 382. Minors in
such facilities are more likely to be strip-searched, shackled, and abused. Id. at
383. Also in violation of the Flores Settlement, non-delinquent minors are often
housed alongside adjudicated juvenile offenders. Id. Finally, unaccompanied
alien children in such facilities are also subjected to solitary confinement. Id.
These examples all violate the Flores settlement’s mandate to hold minors in the
“least restrictive setting.” Id. at 384.
148. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge Memorandum, supra note 20, at 3;
see Mejilla-Romero v. Holder, 614 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 2010) (remanding case to BIA
to re-evaluate case record in light of child-sensitive guidelines).
149. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge Memorandum, supra note 20, at 4–
5. Other suggestions include changing tone and language choice when
questioning minors in court, giving leniency to inconsistent statements by children
when ascertaining credibility, and explaining the procedures before starting. Id.
at 4.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id.
152. See Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004)
(interpreting the regulatory framework as contemplating “that no minor alien
under age eighteen should be presumed responsible for understanding his rights
and responsibilities in preparing for and appearing at final immigration
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adult to whom the minor may be released to ensure the minor’s
153
Additionally, agency regulations
appearance at future hearings.
require personal service of the hearing notice to both the minor,
under age fourteen in this case, and to the adult to whom the
154
minor is released from custody.
Finally, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have also promulgated
regulations supplementing the INA. In immigration court, the
immigration judge cannot accept an admission of removability
from an unaccompanied and unrepresented minor in removal
155
proceedings.
Courts have relied on such regulations in their
decisions, explaining that “[t]he regulatory framework . . .
contemplates that no minor alien under age eighteen should be
presumed responsible for understanding his rights and
responsibilities in preparing for and appearing at final immigration
156
proceedings.”
As such, unaccompanied alien children are
presumed unable to appear in immigration court without an adult
157
or representative.

proceedings”).
153. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3 (2010) (requiring the adult to whom the minor is
released to ensure presence at future hearings).
154. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(ii) (2010); Flores-Chavez, 362 F.3d at 1153
(requiring service upon both the juvenile and the person to whom the regulations
authorize the juvenile’s release).
155. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (“The immigration judge shall not accept an
admission of removability from an unrepresented respondent who is . . . under the
age of 18 and is not accompanied by an attorney or legal representative, a near
relative, legal guardian, or friend . . . .”).
156. Flores-Chavez, 362 F.3d at 1157.
157. Id. Additionally, admissions by unaccompanied alien children to border
patrol during custodial interrogations have also been treated as suspect in removal
proceedings. See Davila-Bardales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 27 F.3d 1,
at 4 (1st Cir. 1994) (criticizing the BIA’s reliance on statements made by
unaccompanied alien children to Border Patrol agents when similar statements in
court would have lacked trustworthiness). In Davila-Bardales, the court held that
since minors lack the ability to appreciate the significance and consequences of
Border Patrol interrogations, scrutiny of admissions made by minors should
extend to the initial stages of the investigative process. Id. at 4. The court relied
on the pre-1996 version of the regulation banning admissions of removability by
minors. See id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(b)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10 (2010)
(replacing section 242.16(b)).
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Some agency policies and guidelines are not mandatory
158
Their promulgation, however, demonstrates the
instructions.
agencies’ acknowledgement that unaccompanied alien children
may warrant different treatment than their adult counterparts.
Thus, blanket treatment of all aliens under section
212(a)(6)(C)(ii) may not be appropriate, especially when
unaccompanied alien children are involved.
Even if courts decline to interpret the BIA’s treatment of
unaccompanied alien children under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) as
inconsistent with the INA, the preceding arguments demonstrate
ample need to legislatively resolve such discordant treatment of
minors.
B. Age as a Mitigating Factor in Juvenile and Criminal Courts
1.

The Advent of the Juvenile Court System

The juvenile justice system is a primary example of the United
States’ recognition that the misdeeds of juveniles should be
handled differently than those of adults. Juvenile courts developed
as part of the progressive social movements of the late nineteenth
159
century. Social reformers of the time believed juveniles were not
160
responsible for their delinquent behavior. They based this belief
on juveniles’ dependency on adults, underdeveloped sense of
161
responsibility, and impaired ability to understand consequences.
As a result, juvenile courts more closely resembled social welfare
162
institutions than adult criminal courts.
Reformers, through
juvenile courts, hoped to rehabilitate juvenile offenders into law163
abiding citizens.

158. While the Foreign Affairs Manual “provides guidance for State
Department officers, the Service is not bound by it.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INS
INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL § 17.5 (2001).
159. Ira M. Schwartz et al., Nine Lives and Then Some: Why the Juvenile Court Does
Not Roll Over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 534 (1998) (describing the
origins of the juvenile court system and the reformers’ belief that juveniles, unlike
adults, could more easily be reformed).
160. Id. at 535.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 534–35.
163. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 7

2011]

BANISHING CHILDREN

1979

The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), passed in
164
1938, defines “juvenile delinquency” as resulting from an act
committed by an individual under eighteen that would be “a crime
165
if committed by an adult . . . .”
This distinction reflects the
United States’ long-standing tradition of dealing with juvenile
166
offenders differently than adults.
One of the persistent
justifications for addressing juvenile crime differently is “the hope
that juveniles can be rechanneled into becoming law abiding
167
citizens.”
The protections afforded under the FJDA are not
limited to juveniles with U.S. citizenship; the Act specifically applies
168
Thus, even when the juvenile in
to non-citizen juveniles as well.
question is undocumented with parents living abroad, the
government must still make reasonable efforts to notify the parents
169
or, alternatively, the foreign consulate of the juvenile’s custody.
Additionally, the FDJA requires officials to bring juveniles before a
magistrate judge as soon as possible or, at the latest, within a
170
reasonable time period.
In addition to notice and arraignment requirements, the FJDA
mandates housing alleged juvenile offenders in an appropriate
juvenile facility in which they will not interact with adult offenders
171
or already adjudicated juvenile delinquents.
Like DHS
guidelines, the FJDA urges that juveniles be placed in a foster home
172
or community-based facility when possible.

164. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938, ch. 486, §§ 1–9, 52 Stat. 764-66
(1938) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–42 (2006)).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 5031.
166. See S. REP. NO. 93-1011, at 5290 (1974).
167. Id.
168. United States v. Doe, 862 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1988). The court
explained that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA) was enacted to
protect the due process rights of juveniles. Such protection, however, is not
“coextensive with constitutional guarantees.” Id. at 783 (Wallace, J., concurring in
part).
169. Id. at 779–80. The court ultimately remanded the case for failure to
notify the parents or the Mexican consulate and for an unreasonable delay in
arraigning the juvenile. Id. at 781.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 5033; Doe, 862 F.2d at 780 (explaining under what
circumstances a delay of thirty-six hours before arraignment would be considered
reasonable under the FDJA.).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 5035.
172. See id. The Act requires that juveniles be given adequate heat, food,
water, and recreational opportunities in whatever facility they have been placed.
Id.
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U.S. law recognizes that minors are in a special category of the
population. The juvenile system considers age as a mitigating
173
factor in punishing offenders.
The recognition of minors’
inexperience, immaturity, and vulnerability is also found in the
immigration system to a limited extent. However, provisions that
address the situation of minors fall short of the protection
necessary to adequately protect the interests of unaccompanied
alien children in the U.S. immigration system.
2.

Juveniles Exempted from Harshest Penalties in Criminal Courts

The U.S. Supreme Court has long “recognized that the status
174
Thus, for juveniles who
of minors under the law is unique. . . .”
go through the criminal courts, rather than the juvenile system,
their age and immaturity may still be limiting factors protecting
175
them from the most severe sentences.
The Supreme Court has
employed categorical rules in two decisions shielding juvenile
offenders from the two most severe penalties available in criminal
law: the death penalty and a life sentence without parole.
a.

Juveniles Are Categorically Ineligible for the Death Penalty

In Roper v. Simmons, the Court drew the line for death penalty
176
The Court explained, “[T]he reasons
eligibility at age eighteen.
why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities
of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as
177
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”
The Court reasoned
173. See Schwartz et al., supra note 159 (charting the juvenile court’s historical
focus on rehabilitation of juveniles).
174. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979).
175. See id. at 634–40 (discussing the reasons the rights of children are not
identical to those of adults).
176. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (expanding Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988)). Prior to the Roper decision, the Supreme Court categorically excluded
another group of individuals from the death penalty. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321 (2002), the Court concluded that subjecting mentally retarded
defendants to the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned defendants’ mental deficiencies “do
not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their
personal culpability.” Id. at 318. The justifications behind the death penalty,
mainly retribution and deterrence, do not apply when the defendant cannot
mentally appreciate his or her actions. Id. at 319. More importantly, the risk that
the death penalty would be imposed regardless of the mitigating factors presented
an especially grave potential for the Court. Id. at 320.
177. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835).
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an offender should not be eligible for the most severe sanction
until reaching the age at which American society recognizes
178
adulthood.
The Court cited three rationales justifying its categorical linedrawing. First, youth generally lack the maturity and responsibility
found in adults that may lead to “impetuous and ill-considered
179
actions and decisions” on the part of juveniles. Juveniles’ lack of
maturity, the Court argues, is what prompts nearly every state to
prohibit minors “from voting, serving on juries, or marrying
180
without parental consent.” Second, minors are more affected by
181
Finally,
negative or peer pressure than their adult counterparts.
182
a juvenile’s character is not as fully formed as that of an adult.
These reasons convinced the Court that allowing juveniles to be
condemned to death violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
183
Amendments.
Prior to Roper, the Supreme Court had laid the groundwork for
avoiding the “uncritica[l] transfer[] [of legal theories] to [the]
184
determination of a State’s duty towards children.”
First, the
Court noted that due to juveniles’ vulnerability, the State may
modify its legal system when dealing with juveniles to account for
the “needs [of juveniles] for ‘concern, . . . sympathy, and . . .
185
paternal attention.’”
Second, states may impose certain
limitations on a juvenile’s right to make important decisions that
186
carry “serious consequences.”
This limitation reflects the belief
that minors lack the necessary experience and judgment to avoid
187
Finally,
making decisions that will have harmful consequences.
the state may require parental consent for certain decisions to
protect juveniles from adverse consequences or “their own
188
immaturity.”
Applying unmodified legal principles to juveniles
178. Id. at 574 (“The age of 18 is . . . where society draws the line . . . between
childhood and adulthood. It is . . . the age at which the line for death eligibility
ought to rest.”).
179. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 570.
183. Id. at 578.
184. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633–34 (1979) (quoting May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953)).
185. Id. at 635 (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 637.
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appears incompatible with protective measures taken by courts and
states.
b. Juveniles Are Categorically Exempted from Life in Prison
Without Parole
A recent Supreme Court decision broadened the protective
treatment of juvenile offenders charged as adults in criminal
189
courts. In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court again employed
a categorical rule to prevent courts from imposing a life sentence
in prison without the possibility of parole on non-homicide juvenile
190
offenders.
In its decision, the Court wrote: “Categorical rules
191
tend to be imperfect, but one is necessary here.”
The Court’s concern over the possibility of injustice with a
192
case-by-case approach greatly informed the decision.
In
particular, the Court focused on the special problems attorneys
may face in representing juvenile offenders. The Court noted that
juveniles tend to mistrust adults and do not fully understand the
193
criminal justice system.
As such, they are less likely to assist
194
counsel with their own defense.
A categorical rule, the Court
195
argues, is more likely to remedy such difficulties.
More importantly, the Court wrote, “a categorical rule gives all
juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity
196
and reform.”
The Court found sentencing juveniles to a life
without hope of “fulfillment outside prison walls” and “no chance
197
for reconciliation with society” too harsh to allow.

189. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). Prior to the Graham decision, the United States
was one of only two countries—the other being Somalia—that had not ratified the
Convention on Rights of the Child of 1989, which forbids sentencing juveniles to
life in prison without parole. Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing
Our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 1009
(2008) (“The CRC . . . codifies an international customary norm of human rights
that forbids the sentencing of child offenders to [life in prison without parole].”).
Although life in prison without parole is the harshest penalty available next to the
death penalty, critics argue it is “effectively a death sentence carried out by the
state over a long period of time.” Id. at 984.
190. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032–34.
191. Id. at 2030.
192. See id. at 2031–33.
193. Id. at 2032.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2032–33.
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Many of the same concerns that have prompted the Supreme
Court over the years to protect juvenile offenders from the harshest
consequences are also found in the immigration context. The
Graham decision is especially compelling since a case-by-case
analysis for unaccompanied alien children presents concerns
similar to those that convinced the Court to craft a categorical rule
in that case.
Like sentencing juveniles to life in prison without parole,
permanently barring unaccompanied alien children from the
United States destroys all hope of reuniting with family in the
country. A categorical rule excluding unaccompanied alien
children from the false claims provision allows the minor some
hope of returning to the United States with legal status at some
point in his or her life.
Recognizing the need to be flexible in responding to the
offenses of minors is not a new concept in the United States.
Extending this understanding into the realm of immigration does
not give unaccompanied alien children a free pass to disregard the
laws of the country without consequences. It does, however,
prevent the door to legal status in the United States from being
permanently closed to these individuals based on acts committed at
the age when even U.S. citizens cannot fully participate in society.
VI. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS
Policy reasons support recognizing the unique and vulnerable
situation in which unaccompanied alien children may find
themselves.
First, international law principles warrant affording better
protections to unaccompanied alien children. The Convention on
Rights of the Child of 1989 (CRC) mandates a new child-centered
198
perspective when dealing with children.
The CRC’s preamble
198. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the
Child], available at 1989 WL 503756. Within two years of its adoption, over one
hundred parties had ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
and by 1997, 191 parties had ratified. Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer
the Children?: A Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 164 (2006) (outlining the basic
components of the CRC as provisional, protective, and participatory rights).
Proponents of the CRC claim it “revolutionized the . . . approach to children,
turning them from family possessions into individual agents, from objects into
subjects . . . .” Jacqueline Bhaba & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature:
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quotes the Universal Declaration’s assertion that “childhood is
199
Signatories to the
entitled to special care and assistance . . . .”
CRC are required to protect children and provide them with
200
adequate care.
While the United States has not ratified the
201
CRC, the international community has demonstrated its concern
for the rights of children.
Second, “[u]naccompanied alien children represent the
intersection of three” populations historically denied full
protection in the United States—aliens in general, aliens without
202
lawful status, and minors.
The experiences of these
203
seldom inform the discussion on
“[u]nenviable [h]ybrid[s]”
204
immigration law in any meaningful way.
As such, lawmakers
should be careful to include protective measures that reflect the
reality faced by such individuals.

Unaccompanied Child Asylum Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines, 11 INT’L J. REFUGEE
L. 84, 93 (1999) (discussing the importance of the CRC’s child-centered approach
to children’s asylum claims).
199. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 198; Rutkow &
Lozman, supra note 198, at 165.
200. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 198; Danuta Villarreal,
To Protect the Defenseless: The Need for Child-Specific Substantive Standards for
Unaccompanied Minor Asylum-Seekers, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 743, 757 (2004)
(explaining that the CRC uses a “child-centered perspective” for safeguarding
children’s rights).
201. Opponents to U.S. ratification cite concerns over sovereignty, federalism,
family planning, and parental rights as reasons the United States has not ratified
the CRC. Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 198, at 173–80 (“As a direct result of
these concerns . . . opponents of the treaty’s ratification introduced bills in the
House and Senate . . . to ‘protect the fundamental right of a parent to direct the
upbringing of a child . . . .’”). They argue it interferes with parental rights in a way
that threatens “fundamental family relationships.” Id. at 179.
202. Corneal, supra note 17, at 617
(“[D]etermining the rights of
unaccompanied alien children under U.S. law is a complex task requiring an
examination of immigration law broadly, domestic law as it pertains to children,
and the intersection of the two.”).
203. Id. at 625.
204. See id. at 656. Commentators have called for including children’s
perspectives in the discussion surrounding immigration policies in order to better
protect immigrant children. Id. For further discussion of children’s rights in the
immigration system see Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids, supra note 17, at 980 (“[L]ifealtering determinations in immigration matters routinely are reached without
consideration of the voices and viewpoints of children who are directly involved.”).
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Several potential approaches to the false claims provision
could drastically improve the situation for unaccompanied alien
children. The following recommendations do not deviate from or
unreasonably stretch current laws; instead, as demonstrated in
previous sections, they fall within well-established boundaries of
205
existing law in the United States.
First, the courts could interpret section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) to
categorically exclude unaccompanied alien children from its scope.
The INA and agency regulations present ample examples of
specialized treatment for unaccompanied alien children that make
little sense when compared to the severe penalties imposed for
206
false claims to citizenship.
Second, if courts cannot interpret the INA to exclude
unaccompanied alien children, a legislative amendment could
explicitly exclude unaccompanied alien children from being
207
permanently barred under the INA.
The legislature has
demonstrated its concern for minor aliens over the years and has
208
previously excluded them from severe penalties in the INA. The
205. See supra Part V (discussing existing INA provisions, regulations, and
criminal court decisions).
206. See supra Parts V.B, V.C.
207. Advocates for reforming the asylum provisions cite a congressional
mandate as a preferred option. Villarreal, supra note 200, at 772–73 (arguing
Congress is the appropriate forum for substantive changes to asylum procedures
for unaccompanied alien children given the deference it receives in the
immigration arena). Since the earliest days of immigration laws, courts have
deferred to Congress’ plenary power in enacting immigration regulations. Id. at
772. Congress is considered the “appropriate forum” for proposing such changes
since it presents the best opportunity to fully evaluate and debate the merits of
reforms. Id. at 772–73. An advantage to the legislative route for asylum reform is
that “Congress could . . . consider whether amending the Immigration and
Nationality Act ‘would further the humanitarian policy reasons underpinning
grant of asylum.’” Id. at 773 (citations omitted). A congressional mandate
exempting unaccompanied alien children from section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) would
likewise allow for comprehensive debate, investigation, and be afforded deference
by the courts. See id. at 772–73.
208. See, e.g., Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631
(2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.) (providing
protection from findings of bad moral character, unlawful voting charges, and
allegations of falsely claiming citizenship if certain criteria are met);
Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1172, 109th Cong.
(2005) (proposing procedural safeguards to protect unaccompanied alien
children).
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Child Citizenship Act of 2000 and DREAM Act of 2010 are just a
few examples of laws Congress can use to lessen the sting of the
209
permanent bar.
A legislative amendment would ensure
uniformity in the treatment of unaccompanied alien children
under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) and prevent injustices that might
210
arise from case-by-case treatment.
In this regard, a legislative
amendment may be the ideal option for addressing section
212(a)(6)(C)(ii)’s harsh results.
A third option is to statutorily create a waiver for
unaccompanied alien children who falsely claim citizenship. The
legislature could extend the waiver available for misrepresentations
under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) to include false claims to
211
citizenship. This option would be less protective of minors’ rights
but would at least remove the sting of the automatic permanent
bar.
Finally, courts could treat false claims by unaccompanied alien
children as automatically retracted if made before being in the
212
presence of a guardian or legal guardian.
As unaccompanied
alien children are not presumed to be responsible during removal
proceedings, the same minors should not be presumed capable of
making a rational decision to expose the false claim before
evidence of it surfaces. Their inability to make decisions in their
best interests via cost-benefit analyses should not determine their
inadmissibility for the rest of their lives.

209. See supra Part III.B (discussing historical amendments to the INA).
210. The Supreme Court’s concern over potential injustices from a case-bycase analysis has prompted it to promulgate categorical rules excluding minors
and mentally retarded defendants from the most severe penalties in criminal
court. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding non-homicidal
juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life in prison without parole); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (excluding juveniles from death penalty eligibility);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (concluding mentally retarded defendants
are not eligible for the death penalty). In the Roper decision, the Court’s
categorical rule stemmed from the concern that a gruesome crime could
overpower mitigating factors that may warrant a lesser sentence on the juvenile.
543 U.S. at 573. Such potential represented an “unacceptable likelihood” for the
Court. Id.
211. See INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (2006).
212. Agency
regulations
supplementing
other
provisions
prevent
unaccompanied alien children from taking actions adverse to their interests. See,
e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (2010) (preventing unaccompanied alien children from
admitting removability in immigration court without an attorney or guardian
present).
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Any one of these recommendations could significantly
improve the situation for unaccompanied alien children who make
false claims to citizenship. Recognizing the unique situation
unaccompanied alien children are in does not sanction ignoring
U.S. immigration laws. Even if such measures are implemented,
unaccompanied alien children who make false claims would not be
213
receiving a free pass into the country. Such minors would still be
required to demonstrate they are otherwise admissible and that
214
they have a legal avenue for being in the United States.
More
lenient measures would, however, prevent the door to legal
immigration to the United States from being forever closed and
dead-bolted for mistakes made while legally a child.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Unaccompanied alien children comprise one of the most
disadvantaged populations to go through the U.S. immigration
system. Despite their disadvantaged position, they are afforded
only a few protections modified to adequately address their
situation. Permanently barring unaccompanied alien children
from seeking legal status in the United States hardly seems
compatible with Lady Liberty’s welcoming decree or the INA’s
broader statutory treatment of such minors.
Section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the INA should exclude
unaccompanied alien children from the sting of permanent
inadmissibility for falsely claiming citizenship. Such an exemption
upholds the United States’ tradition of modifying legal processes to
account for the immaturity and unique needs of minors.
Excluding unaccompanied alien children from the permanent bar

213. In fact, creating a non-immigrant visa category for unaccompanied alien
children has been largely criticized.
See Carolyn J. Seugling, Toward a
Comprehensive Response to the Transnational Migration of Unaccompanied Minors in the
United States, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 861, 889 (2004) (“[F]amily reunification
and unity has been a longstanding goal of immigration policy, and statutory
provisions should not be created that would thwart this policy which is in the best
interest of the child”). One side effect of such a status could be encouraging
families to separate if they believed sending their child to the United States would
be in the child’s best interests. Id. The potential negative effects of such a visa,
not to mention the ensuing political firestorm, indicate other options may be
preferable in this situation. See id.
214. See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (describing grounds of
inadmissibility); INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (explaining requirements for
adjustment of status).
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to citizenship is also justified when looking at the INA as a whole.
This protection should extend to inadmissibility based on false
claims to citizenship. Unaccompanied alien children, legally
children by U.S. standards, should not be permanently barred from
all legal avenues into the United States based on childhood
mistakes.
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